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AUTOCRACY TO DEMOCRACY:
HOW AFRICAN AUTOCRATS HAVE FALLEN AND WHAT HAPPENS NEXT 
YUBIN LEE 
ABSTRACT 
The past decade was not a good one for African democracies. Many autocrats are 
still in power and consolidating existing infrastructure to extend their rule indefinitely. 
However, autocrats eventually fall, both from reasons related to mortality and others. 
Looking at five cases of autocrats leaving office in the last decade, this paper looks to 
show that the different methods wherein autocrats are removed from office make a 
difference in how democracy may be consolidated in the power vacuum. The paper 
finds that not only does the method of removal not matter, but the power vacuum left by 
the autocrat does not give room for democracy to grow. 
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20 years after the third wave of democracy hit Africa, there are still autocrats all 
over Africa. These autocrats have cleverly manipulated the system to create a facade of 
democracy that the international community is willing to accept, if begrudgingly. 
Presidents for life, such as Uganda’s Museveni and Rwanda’s Kagame, have thwarted the 
rule of law in order to remain in power for extended amounts of time. With the autocrats 
employing increasing amounts of clever methods to remain in power, transition through 
democratic means might not be possible. 
The name of the game has certainly changed since the last wave. The decade of 
the 90’s brought fresh hope to democracy in Africa; hope that was more often than not 
squandered. The autocrats that cemented their power in the last wave of democracy are 
aging: Museveni is 76, and Biya is 88. At some point their grip in the country should 
falter and their reigns end. After the 2000s, the international community continuously 
asked for more democracy from African countries; most countries in Africa have 
multiparty elections now -- however unequal the playing field may be.  
In 2017, the unthinkable happened: Mugabe was ousted from power in the form 
of a coup. Mugabe, being one of the oldest leaders of state in the world, had a falling out 
when he pushed his wife to be his successor. The military intervened and seated 
Mugabe’s ex-vice president, Mnangagwa, into power. While there was a presidential 
election, Mnanagagwa was able to retain power. 
In 2019, another unthinkable: Sudan’s dictator, Omar al Bashir, left office 
forcibly due to popular insurrection and intervention from the military. Democratic 
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progress has been floundering due to a myriad of issues, chief of which being the ongoing 
pandemic. The situation is still ongoing.  
The central question for this paper, therefore, is: how can democracy manifest 
after a long-serving autocrats leave? While focusing on Africa, this question reverberates 
throughout contemporary history. Leaders such as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have 
been at the helm of their countries since at least the turn of the century. Putin and Xi are 
painfully aware of his mortality -- their chief worry is to groom a successor who will 
carry on their work. One must realize, however, that Xi and Putin have been synonymous 
to the countries that they have been ruling, as they have shaped contemporary China and 
Russia. Should they perish, the gap left would not easily be filled. 
The hole that they leave when they retire can only lead to some sort of infighting 
within the higher echelon of the system. While the gap left by African autocrats may not 
be as impacting internationally as those left by international giants, it might be significant 
enough in the state to crack the door ever so slightly to allow room for democracy. 
Several questions come to mind while looking at these contemporary examples. 
First, how do African autocrats lose power? Supposedly, they have been able to subvert 
the system to stay in power for exorbitant amounts of time. What chain of events would 
lead someone in a stable position to lose out? 
Second, does ousting an autocrat result in a system that is hospitable for 
democracy? An autocrat that leaves -- whether voluntarily or forcibly -- would leave a 




The paper will look at examples from five countries that have had autocrats leave 
office through various means in the 2010s -- Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe. The five cases represent four different ways that 
autocratic regimes have fallen and the different ways that the ensuing government dealt 
with the aftermath.  
Say that it isn’t possible to oust the autocrat by democratic elections. This means 
that the country has to look toward off-the-book methods of deposition. A coup would be 
the most surefire way, but there is a big chance for the military to take over: back to 
square one. Mass mobilization of civilians would certainly be an event that is broadcasted 
around the international community. But a civilian protest doesn’t necessarily lead to a 
democratic society: more often than not, the leader would make small concessions to 
appease the public. Mass mobilization of civilians might also invite the military to crack 
down, resulting in civilian casualties. 
 The Regime Change section will examine literature around the world to determine 
what combination of variables result in an autocrat leaving office. The democratization 
section will look at literature around the word since the start of the Arab Spring to 
pinpoint which combination of variables result in a long-standing democracy after regime 
change. The aim of the two sections will be to produce a formula that can travel. 
The case study section will apply the findings from the previous sections to 
contemporary case studies. The goal of this project is to investigate if the fall of an 






 The majority of African governments have certain democratic tendencies but 
don’t have the civil liberties associated with a healthy democracy. Rather, the leaders of 
these countries use repression along with democratic infrastructure in order to exercise 
authoritarian rule. Linz and Stephan write that these types of governments are 
“authoritarian democratic hybrid regimes. (L&J, 2013).  
Most African countries -- with the exception of Eswatini, which is an absolute 
monarch -- have elections. Most African countries have constitutions that, to a certain 
extent, have checks and balances. This doesn’t mean, however, that the leaders uphold 
democratic principles. African autocrats have become crafty in manipulating the rule of 
law to suit their needs. 
In a similar vein, most African countries -- with the exception of Eswatini, which 
is an absolute monarch -- have elections. Most African countries have constitutions that, 
to a certain extent, have checks and balances. This doesn’t mean, however, that the 
leaders uphold democratic principles. African autocrats have become crafty in 
manipulating the rule of law to suit their needs. 
 Jackson and Rosberg posit that personal rule is inherently authoritarian (J&R, 
1982, 23). They define authoritarian rule as: 
“an arbitrary and usually a personal government that uses law and the 
coercive instruments of the state to expedite its own purposes of 
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monopolizing power and denies the political rights and opportunities of all 
other groups to compete for that power. (J&R, 1982, 23) 
Personal rule puts the ruler above everyone else. The ruler personifies the power of the 
country. For example, it would be impossible to think of current day Cameroon without 
Paul Biya. 
 Autocrats don’t have to be long-time rulers, although a lot of them are. Of the 
examples that this paper will deal with, there are some who aimed to subvert democratic 
principles in the last few months of their presidency. For the sake of simplicity, however, 
the paper will mainly deal with those who displayed repressive tendencies during their 
tenure. 
 In a democratic society, the government is run by checks and balances. For 
example, the US is run by three branches of government in tandem with the president. 
Each group has different jurisdictions. Although the president is the leader of the country, 
he cannot suddenly decide to deploy troops for his own perceived gains. Such is not the 
case for autocrats. Rather, they finesse domestic politics with two key actors at their side: 
security apparati and elites. These two actors aid autocrats in controlling the masses.  
Autocrats usually have strong ties with the security apparatus, be it the military or 
secret police (Jackson, Rosberg). Because they themselves have kept their position of 
power through forceful means, they are wary that they could lose said position in the 
same way. 
However, security apperati, and more so military organizations, are to be the 
sword of the will of the people (Bellin, 2018). Should the popular mass go against the 
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rule of an autocratic regime, the elites have yet another decision to make: is going against 
the will of the masses more profitable than going against the regime (Bellin, 2018). 
Taking the events of the Arab Spring as guidance, Bellin posits that there are certain 
conditions that lead the security apparatus to stand down against the mass. Most 
importantly, the citizens have to engage in a non-violent protest. Should the mass engage 
in a non-violent means of opposition, the military has less of a ground to justify using 
force. Such was the case for Tunisia and Egypt. 
 It is important to remember that African politics is run by patronage (Jackson, 
Rosberg). The elites that control the security apparatus are incentivized to follow the 
autocrat through the same method. The elites are complacent because they get economic 
and political compensation by doing so. Should the autocrat show indication that they 
will not be able to continue such a relationship, the military would have no reason to 
continue supporting the regime. 
 While the strength of an autocrat comes from the lack of institutions and checks-
and-balance mechanisms, the lack of said mechanisms mean the autocrat has to deal 
directly with elites (J&R, 1982, 25). Should the autocrat lose faith from either one or 
both, the autocrat’s time in office is limited. 
 There are largely five ways that autocrats leave office. First, the autocrat could 
decide that he would step down, and perhaps designate a successor. Second, the autocrat 
could be the victim of a coup. This was the case for the majority of African autocrats. 
Third, the autocrat could be overthrown by popular protest. Fourth, the autocrat could 
pass away in office. Fifth, the autocrat could leave office in a democratic defeat. 
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 While it seems unlikely, there are some authoritarians that step down. Julius 
Nyerere decided to step down in 1989 after ruling Tanzania since independence. He 
established multi party rule in the country as well. President Rawling from Ghana gained 
the presidency via coup but decided to establish a democracy and left office after two 
terms. 
 A coup is perhaps the type of leadership change that is most associated with 
Africa. There have been less and less coups since the fall of the Soviet Union, but that 
doesn’t mean that coups have ceased to exist. Most recently, there have been coups in 
Sudan and Mali that have yet to produce fruitful results of change for the better. 
 Popular protest swept through North Africa and the Arab world during the Arab 
spring but failed to see any long lasting changes for the better. The only success story of 
the regional movement was Tunisia. However, one must remember that having a less 
democratic regime doesn’t necessarily mean that the mass will eventually rise up. Before 
the Arab Spring, political scientists even went on to theorise that there were zones of 
influence in the world that defies the allure of democracy (Huntington, 1996). 
 Recently, the president of Tanzania -- an avid denier of COVID -- was not seen 
for an extended period of time and was declared to be passed away. Considering the 
dominant status of the ruling party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), the vice president Suhulu 
became the president. There aren’t a lot of cases where an autocrat dies in office, but it 
does happen. 
 Lastly, some autocrats accept democratic defeat. Prime example would be 
Kenneth Kaunda, former president of Zambia. While Kaunda was president for decades, 
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bad international and domestic situations resulted in him accepting multiparty 
democracy. He lost to Frederik Chiluba (Bratton, 1992). 
 On the other hand, an autocrat could illegally dispute the election results. This 
was the case for The Gambia and Cote d'Ivoire. As will be discussed in the case 
selection, the leaders disputed the election results -- which were considered to be correct 
according to domestic and international authorities -- and tried to take back the 
presidency forcefully. 
 In all of these reasons except for the fourth, there are possible explanations as to 
why it happened. Treisman found that there are largely five ways that autocrats fall: 
hubris, needless risk taking, premature reform, Trusting the wrong person, and needless 
violence (Treisman, 2020). Hubris is when an autocrat puts too much trust in his power 
and undermines the wrong person. Risk taking may be opening up the government to 
democratic reforms when the autocrat doesn’t have an iron grip on its populace. 
Premature reform would be a case where the government introduces reforms that they are 
not fully ready for. An autocrat could also trust the wrong person to succeed him, which 
could effectively end autocratic rule. Or an autocrat could engage in pointless violence 
that leads to mass uprising. 
 Naturally, autocrats would want to avoid all of this from happening, often with a 
carrot or a stick. Autocrats can either utilize their position to entice the masses from 
going against them, or they can utilize their position to reprimand those who participate 
in unruly behavior. 
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For the first scenario, the autocrat would create a system wherein the people 
would benefit from the resources that the country has to offer. Of course, this is in the 
case that there are substantial resources available in the country as is the case in various 
Middle Eastern countries. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates use oil revenue to 
service the populace and keep them happy. A happy mass is a mass that will not rise up. 
This is the argument that Ross made in his seminal article, Does Oil Hinder Democracy 
(Ross 2001). Natural resources, because they are profitable, makes it easier for the regime 
to appease the mass. 
Ross posits that there are three causal mechanisms that supports the lack of 
democracy in oil/mineral rich states: 
“A ‘rentier effect,’ which suggests that resource rich governments use 
low tax rates and patronage to relieve pressures for greater 
accountability; a ‘repression effect,’ which argues that resource wealth 
retards democratization by enabling their governments to boost their 
funding for internal security; and a ‘modernization effect,’ which holds 
that growth based on the export of oil and minerals fail to bring about 
the social and cultural change that tend to produce democracy. (Ross, 
2001, 327-328)  
Ross finds that high taxes resulted in a more democratic government. Adversely, higher 
government consumption of the GDP and leads to a less democratic government. The 
larger the government is, the less likely it is for the government to be democratic. Ross 
also finds that while an abundance of oil might lead to a bigger military, mineral wealth 
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doesn’t necessarily correlate with a military size. Ross also found that ethnic tension 
doesn’t necessarily go hand in hand with undemocratic governance. 
 However, Ross’s findings were regarding regimes all across the world through a 
prolonged amount of time. One should be skeptical if Ross’s work travels to 
contemporary Africa, as Africa’s system of governance has developed like none other.  
Additionally, Ross considered all democracies equal in his analysis. This couldn’t 
be further from the truth -- especially in contemporary Africa. It would be foolish to 
equate the democratic structure of governance found in Ethiopia with that found in 
Senegal. 
Another way would be for the autocrat to employ the use of force against the 
populace. This was the case for a lot of African countries in the past, such as Uganda 
under Idi Amin. Out of the two options, this would be less appealing for an autocrat that 
wishes to retain power for an indefinite period of time. An overly oppressive system of 
governance brings scrutiny from the international community. In the case of Idi Amin, 
his rule was thwarted when Julius Nyerere, along with the backing of the international 
community, stormed the country at the endpoint of the Ugandan-Tanzanian War.  
 
Democratization 
Leadership change does not guarantee democratic rule. As mentioned earlier, 
Egypt’s mass protests, along with the military stand down, was met with regime change. 
Long-time autocrat Hosni Mubarak was ousted from power, lending way for a civilian, 
Morsi, to become president. Morsi’s rule, however, was not long lived; civilian protests 
coupled with a coup in 2013 ousted the 5th president of Egypt. Again, the regime changes 
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only took a turn for the worse, since Egypt’s issue regarding violence and corruption has 
not changed since the initial ousting of Mubarak. 
 The cases that the paper is looking at incorporates all types of leadership change. 
A president could be ousted due to a coup, or a president could resist transition until 
he/she is exiled by the incoming president. The president could also leave the presidency 
but still hold onto enormous amounts of power. Finally, the president could die in office. 
 Previous works on democratic transition have focused on other parts of the world. 
Acemoglu and Robinson talked about the four main paths of political development. First, 
a path that leads from non-democracy gradually to democracy. This kind of democracy is 
never threatened, such as the democracy in Britain. There is a path that leads to 
democracy but quickly collapses, such as in Argentina. Democratization happens again 
and again in this path. The third, which diverges into two paths, is one where a country 
remains non-democratic, or democratization is delayed. Democracy could never set 
because the society is relatively fair and prosperous, such as in Singapore, but also 
because the society is highly unequal and exploitative, such as with Apartheid South 
Africa. They found that democratic transitions happen when the elite controlling the 
existing regime extend concessions too far. 
Looking at the cases at hand, it seems that the countries took the path of Argentina 
or Apartheid South Africa. Both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe 
had leaders that made the wealth gap highly unequal and exploitative, and The Gambia 
and Cote d’Ivoire have had democracy set and fall numerous times. The only exception is 
Tanzania, where it seems like they took the path of Singapore -- their non-democratic 
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governance had no problems when the country was prosperous, and only became an issue 
when living conditions worsened. 
 O’Donnell and Schmitter define democratization as “the process whereby the rules 
and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously 
governed by other principles or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such 
rights and obligations. (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986)” They also added that there are 
two groups in authoritarian regimes whose orientations change how transition happens. 
The first group are the hardliners, who believe that authoritarian rule is desirable, and the 
sideliners, who believe that some sort of legitimation is necessary.  
 The number of overt hardliners drastically decreased after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, although the advent of China in Africa has brought back a resurgence of 
hardliners. Rather, there are soft-liners who use the west’s markers for democratic 
progress as charades to mask their authoritarian regime.  
This begs the question; what conditions foster democratic rule after a successful 
regime change? Traditional notions of democratic transition would not apply, since the 
economic and social situation would be more or less the same before and after the falling 
of a dictator.  
A mass mobilization of youth is somewhat likely to bring democratic change. The 
key demographic of Tunisia and Egypt (the only two countries that successfully 
administered regime change during the Arab Spring)’s civilian protests were the youth. 
Even outside the confines of Africa and the Middle East, Korea transitioned from 
autocratic rule when university students mobilized in mass against the regime in protest. 
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The youth were critical in installing democratic rule in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine 
(Kuzio, 2006).  
However, there were certain conditions that led to democratization in Tunisia that 
didn’t in Egypt. Linz and Stephan pointed out that the difference was threefold. First, the 
leading party after the revolution distanced itself from Muslim Brotherhood ideology and 
embraced democracy as the ideal form of governance. Second, the liberals in the Tunisian 
government were willing to work with the religious. Third, the political society developed 
in tandem with civil society in Tunisia, while it didn’t in Egypt. These three cases led the 
government to get a score of 3 out of 7 from the Freedom House’s political-rights score 





 Reviewing the literature and looking at examples in real life, it seems unlikely 
that standing autocrats will be driven out of power or that such ousting will result in 
positive, democratic change to a given state. However unlikely it may be, there are times 
when an autocrat loses faith of the different groups that support him, which ultimately 
leads to change in government. The question, however, is whether such changes are 
positive to democracy; in other words, is there room for democracy to set if an autocrat 
leaves office? 
 The paper will argue that it does not, and that the method in which the autocrat 
falls has little consequence. The literature clearly states that autocratic governance is 
more complex than it seems. Museveni has been able to stay in office for as long as he 
has because he appeases the forces that allow it, and the same goes for Paul Biya. Barring 
a purge of a country’s political, economic, and social hierarchy, the same elites will still 
be there after an autocrat passes. Unless the elites themselves view that democracy is 
inevitable, there is no guarantee that any change for democracy will be long-lasting. 
 The paper will look at four of the situations discussed above where autocrats 
could lose power: leaving with a successor in power, coup, death, and electoral defeat. 
Joseph Kabila of the DRC was rumored to have made a deal with Felix Tshisekedi to 
share power after his defeat in the 2019 elections. The DRC will be looked at to 
determine what the level of democracy has been for the country. The coup will be 
represented by the case of Zimbabwe, wherein Mugabe was ousted by his own security 
apparatus. The lack of democratization from electoral defeat will be shown by two cases: 
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Cote d'Ivoire and The Gambia. The two cases will be grouped together due to their 
similarities. The paper will include Tanzania, whose president Magufuli died due to 
disease and was replaced by his vice president, as the cause of death of autocrat.  
 All of the cases -- except for Tanzania -- have had a history of non-democratic 
rule. The DRC, Côte d’Ivore, The Gambia, and Zimbabwe were ruled for decades by 
Mobutu, Houphouet-Boigny, Jawara, and Mugabe (respectively). The case of Tanzania 
was added only to demonstrate that such cases exist, and that in cases such as those, one 





The Gambia and Cote d’Ivore 
 The Gambia was liberated with Dawda Jawara as the head of state -- Jawara 
remained as president until he was driven out of office by Yahya Jammeh in a coup. 
Jawara was forced to exile, which lasted until 2002.  
The previous president, Yahya Jammeh, rose to the position of leadership due to a 
coup in 1994. He was able to retain the seat until 2016, when a presidential election 
swung in favour of the current president, Barrow. His autocratic tendencies, mixed with 
economic strife, led to widespread suffering and discontent from the citizens (Saine, 
2008). 
 Surprisingly enough, Jammeh won the two elections since he took office without 
international condemnation. This does not, however, mean that the elections were in any 
way free or fair. The 2001 election was marred by electoral fraud due to the purposefully 
lax identification procedure that led to an estimated seventy thousand non Gambians 
voting in the election.  
 His rule, however, was marred with exceeding levels of violence. Jammeh passed 
key legislative decisions that allowed the government to crack down on journalists. This 
led to the near death of Ousman Sillah (a human rights lawyer who lives in exile in the 
US), and the death of Deyda Hydara (Saine, 2008). 
Jammeh’s authoritarian rule was met with lukewarm political resistance until the 
2006 elections. While the opposition parties banded together to form the National 
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Alliance for Democracy and Development, the coalition was short lived due to infighting 
(Saine, 2008).  
The violence was often perpetrated by a paramilitary group called the National 
Intelligence Agency (NIS). HRW, in a report compiled in the mid 2010s, stated that: 
The government has targeted journalists, human rights defenders, student 
leaders, religious leaders, political opposition members, judiciary officials, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, and security force 
personnel, among others … The government has also shown little regard for 
the rights of security force personnel who have been accused, rightly or 
wrongly, of seeking to overthrow President Jammeh. 
The 2011 election was won by Jammeh yet again due to divided opposition, 
but that was not to be the case for the 2016 election. Jammeh made several blunders 
that led to the opposition to mobilise. First, Jammeh detained Ousainou Darboe, a 
key opposition leader. Second, Solo Sandeng, another key opposition leader, died in 
prison. These targeted strikes led to 16 opposition parties banding together to form 
the “coalition 2016” with Barrow at the helm (Hultin et.al, 2017). 
 December 9th, 2016, Jammeh seemed to accept defeat to Barrow. The final 
results were in favour of Barrow (Barrow: 43.3%, Jammeh: 39.6%). Considering 
that this was the first democratic transition in the history of The Gambia, the 
citizens tentatively rejoiced. However, the triumph was short lived, as Jammeh 
decided that he would dispute the election results, which was at that time widely 
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accepted by the international community, and take it to the courts. He also deployed 
troops in the capital, Banjul, and the biggest city, Serekunda (Hartmann 2017).  
 While there were serious efforts to mediate the crisis, none worked. Jammeh 
was quite resolute. ECOWAS was quick to respond, and engaged in negotiations. 
ECOWAS’s two pronged approach was to continue negotiations, and create a force 
on standby to ensure Barrow’s presidency should Jammeh refuse to step down by 
his end of term. However, with the threat of military intervention and his army chief 
pledging loyalty to Barrow, Jammeh conceded his loss (Hartmann, 2017). 
 As per his agreement with ECOWAS, Jammeh went into exile to Equatorial 
Guinea, albeit without paying for his human rights infractions. He was still able to 
retain ill-gotten money from his time as president and lives quite comfortably even 
after defeat. 
 Freedom House categorized The Gambia as “not free” between 2013 and 
2016. After Barrow came into power, the designation changed to “partly free”. 
Freedom house states that while certain freedoms and rights have been restored, 
discrimination against LGBTQ community and violence against women are still 
prevalent. 
 Gambia’s case closely mirrors Cote d'Ivoire, which had gone through its 
own presidential-level dispute a few years before The Gambia. Much like The 
Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire was ruled by one head of state for decades after its 
independence. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the president was none other than the 
prominent Houphouet-Boigny. When the founding father passed away, Bedie -- a 
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member of the same party -- became president. Bedie was ousted in a coup and 
Ivory Coast was ruled by the former general Gueii for a short period of time. 
However, Gueii lost an election to Gbagbo. Gueii contested the result via 
militaristic means but was eventually put in exile by the government. 
 Gbagbo was president during the First Ivorian Civil War, which was also 
against the forces of Ouattara against Gbagbo forces. The first civil war was caused 
by legislation that mandated presidents to have parents who are both citizens of 
Cote d'Ivoire. Since Ouattara did not qualify, it was clear that the legislation was to 
bar him from running for office. The violence was quelled with a peace agreement 
in Ouagadougou in 2007. It was due to this conflict that the 2010 election was 
Gbagbo’s first re-election campaign. 
 Gbagbo, in turn, refused to leave his position after his defeat to Ouattara. 
Both Gbagbo and Ouattara were sworn in at the same time. This, of course, led to 
military conflict between the two camps. While international governments and 
international organizations placed sanctions, they were not effective. The sanctions 
led Gbagbo to adopt an ultra-nationalist stance that deterred the French and 
ECOWAS from conducting military interventions (Banegas 2011). Gbagbo also 
utilized the Student Federation of the Ivory Coast (FESCI) -- which played a big 
part in the democratization of the country -- along with the army in order to 
effectively create a state within a state (Banegas 2011).  
 While Gbagbo relied heavily on militaristic approaches, Ouattara resorted to 
legalistic approaches, which was not at all effective in the short term. In the long 
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term, Ouattara’s dependence on the international community translated to a slow 
tightening of options for Gbagbo due to the financial strain put by the sanctions 
(Banegas 2011). 
The conflict was only resolved when French troops, along with pro-Ouattara 
militants, arrested the former president. Gueii was then sent to the Hague to be tried 
for his crimes. Cote d’Ivoire’s ranking in Freedom House did not change and 
remained “partly free” in during and after Gbagbo.  
 The 2016 constitution limited the presidential term limit to two terms, 
limiting the maximum years of presidency 10 years. This would have meant that 
Ouattara should not have been allowed to run in the most recent 2020 elections. 
However, due to the fact that the front runner for Ouattara’s party -- the Rally of the 
Republicans (RDR) -- passed away before the election, Ouattara announced that he 
would in fact be running in the election. He reasoned that the 2016 constitutional 
reform voided his first presidency. His decision to run was backed by the 
Independent Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court. 
 This brazen act of subverting the rule of law was met by boycotting by the 
opposition parties. Freedom House reported that the elections were “neither free nor 
fair.” Out of the 44 parties that put their candidates for the election, only 4 were 
approved. 
One must remember that The Gambia has not had a democratic transition 
before 2016. Jammeh became president after a coup, and the previous president was 
elected by the national assembly. Considering that the 2016 transition was the first 
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of its kind, democratic resilience might only be seen in future elections and their 
successes. 
While it is regrettable that The Gambia is not capable of handing a sentence 
regarding Jammeh’s many human rights violations, the fact that Jammeh is out of 
the picture should be some consolation.  
Much like The Gambia, there have only been a handful of presidents in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Ouattara is only the fourth president of the country. The most recent 
election, however, shows that true democratic transition is more of a dream for this 
country. Ouattara’s policies have become more and more oppressive. 
The repression and subversion of law that was prevalent in Gbagbo’s term 
has been very visible in Ouattara’s presidency as well. Considering the level of 
violence that pro-Ouattara forces committed during their civil war in 2011, it 
shouldn’t be surprising that the president would resort to such methods. While 
Ouattara’s misguided interpretation of the constitutional limit of term in the most 
recent election might be the most striking detail, one should also consider the next 
presidential election. Considering that even Ouattara conceded that there is a term 
limit -- he just decided to consider his first term void -- it would be less likely that 
he would use the same excuse in the upcoming elections.  
 
The DRC 
 The Democratic Republic of the Congo had been ruled by a single family since 
Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown until 2018. President Laurent Kabila, father to Joseph 
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Kabila, overtook the capital and was elected president in 1997. Unfortunately, Kabila 
senior was assassinated in 2001. The assassination led to Joseph Kabila gaining the seat 
of the Presidency. There was no formal election (Sando, 2002). 
 While Joseph Kabila’s presidency wasn’t completely without controversy, his 
abuse of power showed when he refused to step down after his second term. As per the 
Congolese constitution, presidents are only allowed to be in office for two terms. While it 
seemed like Kabila, much like the DRC’s previous leaders, would not leave office, he 
eventually caved and declared that elections would be held in 2017. However, the 
election was delayed until 2018. Kabila was effectively in power until the election. 
 The 2018 election marked the first election in 20 years in which Kabila wouldn’t 
participate in. While the former president was barred from running in the race, he 
endorsed his former interior minister, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. The key opposition 
figures were Félix Tshisekedi and Martin Fayulu.  
 Tshisekedi was victorious in the election, to the surprise of many (Englebert 
2019). The Catholic Church, which stationed 40,000 electoral observers in the nation, 
expected Fayulu to win with a big margin. While Fayulu contested results, there was no 
way for his case to be presided over fairly when Kabila’s former chief of staff was 
leading the constitutional court. Kabila’s allies won the majority of seats in Parliament, 
which could only mean that the DRC was not out of Kabila’s grasp yet (Englebert, 2019). 
 Kabila, now a senator for life, still exercised enormous amounts of power after he 
left office. Tshisekdi had to form a coalition with the former president, since his party did 
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not win a majority needed. This meant that over two thirds of cabinet positions were 
given to pro-Kabila politicians. What ensued was endless squabbling from both sides. 
 Late 2020, however, the Tshisekedi declared that the coalition with the previous 
president would end. He also struck a vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister, 
Sylvester Ilunga, who was an ally of the former president. He then went on to meet with 
the key opposition figures -- Katumbi and Bemba -- to create a “sacred union” that would 
challenge the former president’s party. The situation is still ongoing, but reports tell that 
such a union would be unlikely. 
 It would be important to note that the “not free” designation for the DRC did not 
change with the government transition. There is no reason to believe that the living 
conditions for the citizens have improved at all since Tshisekedi came into power.  
 All other cases observed in this study have had the president leave the country or 
become irrelevant in the years preceding the election. Kabila has not only been able to 
maintain his status as senator-for-life but has also been able to exercise an exorbitant 
amount of power.  
 Kabila’s stalling tactic when it came to exiting the presidency was met by 
widespread protests and international condemnation. It certainly was a win when he 
decided that he would not run for president in the most recent presidential election. 
 According to most independent polls, Fayulu should have won. The election upset 
was due to widespread electoral fraud, such as whole voting machines disappearing 
(Englebert 2018). This infraction, and others, were observed by the Catholic Church and 
many other international observers. 
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 The challenge of the election, considering the court was in Kabila’s hands, was 
never going to be a successful option. Kabila quite brazenly stole the election from the 
rightful victor through nefarious means and put a leader who was at his mercy due to 
Kabila’s majority in congress. 
 Considering these two infractions in the electoral process that the outgoing 
president should not have had involvement in, it is hard to say that Kabila’s leaving office 
has been a boon to DRC democracy. 
 
Zimbabwe 
 Zimbabwe had been ruled by Mugabe since the late 80s. Mugabe’s rule 
only ended when the army took him down with a coup. Mugabe’s long reign should not 
be construed with domination -- that was hardly the case. Zimbabwe had a substantial 
opposition party that started with the ZCTU (Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions). 
However, the fact that ZANU-PF had no internal ties with workers unions is shocking 
since its ideology and the completely different approach of its neighboring Zambia 
(LeBas, 2011). 
ZCTU was formed by the ruling party to corral the workers unions. However, the 
ZCTU was never able to establish a strong connection with the workers on the ground. 
ZCTU’s policies changed drastically when Tsvangirai became the president, as he was 
responsible for the split from the ruling party. Under Tsvangirai’s leadership, ZCTU 
became the main vocal opponent to Mugabe and his government. 
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However, the ZCTU was not the only opposition party that formed in the 90s. The 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was formed and merged with the ZCTU to 
create the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change). The MDC, led by opposition leader 
Morgan Tsvangirai, managed to successfully oppose Mugabe and his ZANU-PF in the 
2000 constitutional referendum. This loss was the official starting point for electoral 
violence in Zimbabwe (Levitsky&Way, 2010). 
 The following elections were marred by electoral violence in order to keep MDC 
at bay. At points, it seemed like the MDC would win over Zimbabwe. In particular, many 
believed that Tsvangirai would win the 2002 election (Levitsky & Way, 2010). However, 
an oppressive campaigning front he side of the Mugabe camp led to a loss for the MDC. 
 The MDC split into two factions at the wake of the 2005 senate elections: MDC-
T, which was led by Morgan Tsvangirai, and MDC, which was led by Welshman Ncube. 
Naturally, the fractioned opposition made it less likely for ZANU-PF to be threatened. 
After yet even more electoral fraud from the ruling party, MDC-T and ZANU-PF 
established a unity government in 2009. While this allowed Tsvangirai and his party to 
gain a level of power that they didn’t previously have, the real power remained with the 
ruling party. 
 The 2008 election was the first real challenge to Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s 
hegemony. Tsvangirai was able to win the first round of voting with just shy of 50 
percent. It is theorized that the election was tampered with, and that Tsvangirai would 
have won with enough votes to win without a runoff (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The 2008 
election resulted in a power sharing structure between ZANU-PF and MDC-T. While this 
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may have been seen as a victory at the time, the Transitional Inclusive Government 
implicated MDC-T in corruption. They were also seen as wanting to share the spoils with 
ZANU-PF rather than thwarting the ruling party (Booysen, 2014) 
 ZANU-PF (and to an extent Mugabe)’s origin came from fighting against the 
white Rhodesian government through militaristic means. This meant that -- from the start 
of independence -- the party was mainly ruled by military leaders. As such, figures such 
as Mnangagwa and Chiwenga were in key positions. Which is why Mugabe’s decision to 
sack both of them in order to pave the way for his wife to succeed him was met by 
hostility.  
 ZANU-PF was painfully aware of Mugabe’s mortality and was in motion to pick 
a successor by the mid 2010s. There were two main factions; one led by Mnangagwa and 
the other led by Grace Mugabe. Mnangagwa’s faction -- nicknamed Lacoste -- had 
“strong links to the military and key branches of the state. (Beardsworth et.al, 2019)” 
Grace’s faction, the G40 (Generation 40), was a ragtag group of young politicians that 
were “associated with but never led by Grace Mugabe,” From the start, Grace Mugabe’s 
political ambitions were not supported by the general public -- she was widely unpopular 
due to her lavish lifestyle in the time of crisis for Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s decision to sack 
the most important members of Lacoste was him implicitly supporting his wife’s political 
dreams. 
 In light of the sackings, the military staged a coup -- named “Operation Restore 
Legacy” -- in order to oust Mugabe and put Mnangagwa in a place of power. The coup 
also resulted in the banishment of Grace Mugabe and G40 from ZANU-PF. The coup, 
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however, was a temporary solution for the Mnangagwa’s faction, as any violent non-
democratic means of taking power would not be looked upon fondly by the international 
community. Therefore, Mnangagwa would run as a candidate during the 2018 elections. 
 In preparation for the first presidential election without Mugabe in a generation, 
the MDC-T allied with six other parties. However, Tsvangirai passed away in early 2018, 
leaving the position of leader of MDC-A (Movement for Democratic Change - Alliance) 
open. Tsvangirai’s death led to infighting in the MDC-T camp when Nelson Chamisa 
seized power.  
 Beardsworth et al touts that “in many ways the election was a masterclass on how 
to re-legitimize a government without risking losing power.” On the methods 
Mnangagwa utilized to do so, they go on to write that: 
“First, Mnangagwa effectively ran against his own political legacy, 
denouncing the Mugabe regime and presenting himself as the ‘change' 
candidate. As part of this process, he promised extensive reforms and global 
re-engagement, frequently repeating the mantra that Zimbabwe was ‘open for 
business'. Second, meaningful improvements in the electoral landscape were 
introduced. Despite initial skepticism among the opposition, the campaign 
was significantly more open than that of 2013. (Beardsworth et.al, 2019). 
While it was the case that the election process was admittedly cleaner than that of 
previous years, the previous elections were no high bar.  
 The 2018 election brought scores of election observers from around the 
world: the European Union, United States, African Union, and South African 
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Development Community, to name a few. EU observers reported that there was 
voter intimidation and unproportional media coverage for opposition leaders, while 
US observers reported military use by ZANU-PF for intimidation purposes and the 
use of bribes such as food to loyalists. The election was hardly fair but was 
begrudgingly accepted by Africa and the international community (Onslow, 2018). 
 The MDC, citing the irregularities given by international and domestic 
observers, contested the elections. Protestors took to the streets and were met with 
extreme violence by military and riot police. However, the election results were not 
successfully contested. 
 Reports from Freedom House suggest that the level of freedom in the 
country has not improved since Mnangagwa took office. In their 2017 report, 
Freedom House gave Mugabe’s Zimbabwe a “Partly Free” designation. In their 
2021 report, Mnangagwa’s Zimbabwe got a “Not Free” designation.  
 The MDC-Alliance fractured due to infighting in 2020: a feat that was 
attributed to ZANU-PF strategy. MDC-T had already fractured from MDC-A with 
Khupe at the helm. The Zimbabwean Supreme Court ruled that Khupe was the 
legitimate successor to the late Tsvangirai. This leadership change led to numerous 
members of the MDC-A camp defecting to MDC-T. 
 Throughout the change in leadership, the elite structure remained relatively 
unchanged. The curtain call for Mugabe’s downfall was when Zimbabwe National 
Liberation War Veteran Association (ZNLWVA) denounced him as a dictator. The ZDF 
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was critical in removing Mugabe. Adding in Mnangagwa’s involvement in Mugabe’s 
regime, it is hard to say that the coup and resulting election changed much in Zimbabwe. 
 Rather, the coup and the resulting election was more an elaborate charade to show 
the international community that Mnangagwa is the proper leader of Zimbabwe. It seems 
that the winner of the election was already predestined once Mugabe formally renounced 
his presidency. 
 It is true, however, that the 2018 election was the most successful for the 
opposition in a decade. While the election was not completely free and fair, the relaxed 
laws did allow for MDC to be relatively successful. Freedom House reported that “MDC 
managed to increase its share of parliamentary seats in the 2018 elections despite the 
uneven playing field.” The transitional period and MDC’s alliance seem to have been a 
win for democracy in this aspect. 
 Should O’Donnell and Schmitter's definition of democracy be applied in the case 
of Zimbabwe, there has been little to no visible change in the structure of the government 
that affects the people. Rather, there have been reports of significant human rights abuses. 
 Another point to focus on is the fracturing of opposition. As mentioned above, 
Mnangagwa’s government has used the dysfunctional power dynamics of the main 
opposition coalition to break the agreement. A unified opposition was the reason behind 
the very real challenge in the 2018 elections, but more infighting can only mean that 





 It doesn’t seem like a fall of an autocrat doesn’t lead to long term democratic 
reforms. In the case of Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of the Congo, the ensuing 
election was more or less a show for the western order. The winner was chosen from the 
beginning. The level of democracy in both countries has not gotten better. 
 In the case of Cote d'Ivoire and The Gambia, the only reason the democratically 
elected leaders could gain the presidency was through foreign intervention by ECOWAS 
or France. ECOWAS has had a long history of proactive peacekeeping in West Africa to 
a degree that is not seen around other parts of the region. One simply cannot see 
ECOWAS’s central African counterpart, CEMAC, doing similar things. 
However, intervention from either party is not a given, since ECOWAS intervene 
when there are personal stakes for the states, and France intervenes when there are 
personal stakes for the country. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the current president is 
himself an autocrat, having subverted the rule of law to run for a third term. 
 Should the autocrat be ousted from power, such as Mugabe, Jammeh, or Gbagbo, 
there is not much wiggle room for said autocrat to retain power. While Mugabe tried to 
influence the 2018 election by publicly denouncing Mnangagwa and endorsing the 
opposition, such a move only hurt the opposition due to his reputation. In cases where the 
outgoing autocrat is able to negotiate, such as with Kabila (or even to a certain extent 
Jammeh), the autocrat is able to utilize his position in order to stay in power. Either way, 




 One should note that all of the cases that were examined had a clear line of 
succession. For Cote d'Ivoire and The Gambia, the next president was already set. For 
Kabila, there was an election, however delayed, that produced the next president -- 
however dubious. Zimbabwe clearly was going to have Mnangagwa as the leader after 
Mugabe. Even Tanzania had a clear line of succession after Magufuli died.  
 But what if there isn’t such a line of succession, or if there are a lot of candidates 
vying for the position without a clear strongman? Deby, Museveni, Biya, and Kagame all 
don’t have that certain somebody that they are grooming. With the limited amount of 
contemporary case studies at hand, it is hard to tell. 
 The three groups most important to an autocrat, as mentioned before, are elite, 
security apperati, and the masses. Should the masses be able to create civil disobedience 
that overloads the security apperati, the elites make change. All of the cases, save 
Tanzania, had different forms of civilian protests. Yet, civilian protests were the result of 
the actions of the elite and security apperati. Mugabe and Jammeh were at the mercy of 
the armed forces, since both were betrayed by their own security apparatus. For Mugabe, 
he was also betrayed by the elites, who were members of his party and the military. 
 Therefore, while the absence of an autocrat does mean some democratic 
concessions by the state, the case studies show that such concessions have not translated 
into tangible changes. Rather, the elite and the security apparatus, unless they are 





 Tanzania has been regarded as the hallmark for African democracy, since 
the country has had robust democratic transitions throughout its history. While 
presidential transitions have been regular since Nyrere left office -- and multiparty 
elections have been allowed since 1992 -- all of the presidents have been from the CCM 
(Chama Cha Mapinduzi) party. Even though the opposition parties and media freedom 
has been more or less guaranteed for a long time, Magufuli’s reign as president saw a lot 
of civil liberties taken away. 
While Magufuli’s long lasting legacy might well be his strong denial of the 
severity of COVID in Tanzania, his tenure was marred with subversion of law and 
violence. Al Jazeera reported that Magufuli “outlawed opposition rallies and broadcasting 
of parliament sessions; and introduced legislation which rolled back civil rights.” During 
the most recent 2020 election, the majority of independent electoral observers were not 
let in. The ones that did, such as the Tanzania Election Watch, stated that there were 
“arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, sexual violence and violence against women”. 
Critics say that Magufuli was bringing back the one party system (Bamwenda, 2018) 
Authoritarian behaviour was never anything foriegn to CCM presidents, however. 
The previous president Kikwete did not shy from intimidation tactics when it came to 
winning elections, and passed bills such as the cybercrimes bill that subverted the 
freedom of press. What makes magufuli’s tenure special is that he died in office. While 
the official cause of death -- told by the government -- was heart related issues, many 
believe that he died due to contraction of COVID-19. 
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His death came after weeks of absence, and was followed by the vice president 
Samia Suluhu taking the position of president by default. Suluhu will most likely stay as 
president until the next general election. 
Both Magufli and Suluhu were not favorites to become president or vice 
president. Putting Magufuli as the front runner was CCM’s attempt to diverge from the 
corrupt image of the party. Suluhu was also not the top choice as vice president. This is 
not to say that their political career has diverged far from CCM -- quite the contrary. 
 While it is too early to tell what kind of president she will be, Suluhu has yet to 
get the full support of the party. As a Muslim woman from Zanzibar, there might be 
some pushback to her rule within the party. hospitable to democracy. 
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